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ABSTRACT 
This work discusses common issues that occur from the inadequate integration 
of systems engineering into the project management process.  In so doing, this 
work is shaped by the following questions: What are the most common conflicts 
between Program Management and Systems Engineering during product 
development?  Where in the product development cycle do conflicts occur? How 
can the conflicts be mitigated?  This work identified three main conflicts within the 
product development process of the four case studies, the Hubble telescope, the 
Mars Polar Lander, the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology 
Program, and the Constellation program. The three main problems are 
insufficient systems engineering in the product development process, insufficient 
budget and tight schedule, and inadequate risk management.  These three 
problems eventually led to the mishaps and failures of the case studies examined 
in this thesis.   
This work proposes that in order to mitigate conflicts in the integration of 
project management and systems engineering, systems engineers and project 
management should be able to have a common language, understand each 
other’s objectives, and understand how these objectives benefit both the product 
and the project.  Therefore, its recommendations are that systems engineers be 
trained in project management and project managers be trained in systems 
engineering, and that this training should include risk management.  In this case, 
risk management is the common language between systems engineering and 
project management.  
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Ulrich and Eppinger (2012, p. 2) define product development as “a set of 
activities beginning with the perception of market opportunity and ending in the 
production, sale, and delivery of the product.”  In developing a product, project 
management and systems engineering converge to satisfy both the business 
process and the product process.   
A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (Project 
Management Institute, Inc., 2013, p. 6) defines project management as “the 
application of knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques to project activities to meet 
the project requirements”. 
The International Council of Systems Engineering (INCOSE) Systems 
Engineering Handbook (v3.2) defines systems engineering as:  
…an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization 
of successful systems. It focuses on defining customer needs and 
required functionality early in the development cycle, documenting 
requirements, and then proceeding with design synthesis and 
system validation while considering the complete problem: 
operations, cost and schedule, performance, training and support, 
test, manufacturing, and disposal. SE considers both the business 
and the technical needs of all customers with the goal of providing 
a quality product that meets the user needs. (INCOSE, 2010, p. 7) 
Project management focuses on the tasks required to support the 
development of the product with emphasis on schedule, budget, and 
performance. Systems engineering focuses on the technical aspects related to 
meeting the customer’s needs through the design and development of a solution 
or product.  Project management is concerned with managing budgets and 
schedules while systems engineering is concerned with developing products and 
systems.  
Since project management drives the project process and systems 
engineering deals with the product process, the project manager and the 
systems engineer within a project should work closely to guarantee the 
 xvi
successful outcome of the project and the successful development of the right 
product with the desired performance.  Success with project and product does 
not always happen, as will be exemplified by the discussion of the examples 
examined in the body of the paper, the Hubble telescope, the Mars Polar Lander, 
the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) Program, 
and the Constellation program.  
 Budget and schedule drive projects while milestones drive the systems 
engineering process and the product development process.  As such, conflicts 
can arise between the project management and the systems engineering 
objectives.   
In organizations where project management guides the project process 
and systems engineering guides the product process, it is imperative that these 
two processes work in congruence.  Failure to do this may result in cost and 
schedule overruns and in poor product performance.  The case studies 
discussed in this work will provide examples of cost and schedule overruns and 
poor product performance. 
This work discusses common issues that occur from the inadequate 
integration of systems engineering into the project management process.  This 
work also identifies where in the product development cycle the conflicts occur 
and ways to mitigate the issues. 
The case studies discussed in this work exemplify programs that 
encountered technical issues or mishaps due to either inadequate integration of 
systems engineering with the project management process.   
Three main conflicts within the product development process have been 
identified by this work:  insufficient systems engineering in the product 
development process, insufficient budget and tight schedule, and inadequate risk 
management.  These three situations eventually led to the mishaps and failures 
of the case studies presented.   
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This work concludes that the issues mentioned above result from either 
starting systems engineering late in the process or as insufficient application of 
systems engineering processes in the project as a cost reduction effort.  
As presented through the different case studies, the investigation boards 
assigned to the different programs identified issues throughout the product 
development process.  However, in all the cases, it can be stated that failure to 
establish an adequate systems engineering process in the early planning stages 
of the product development process resulted in issues in the later stages of the 
process.  Examples of the issues on later stages are inability to conduct 
verification and validation efforts due to poorly elicited requirements or the lack of 
documentation of the requirements elicitation, the design process, analyses of 
alternatives, and the validation and verification processes. 
This work proposes that, in order to mitigate conflicts in the integration of 
project management and systems engineering, systems engineers and project 
management should strive to have a common language, work to be able to 
understand each other’s objectives, and try to understand how these objectives 
benefit both the product and the project.   
This understanding and common language, this work proposes, could be 
achieved through the effective training of project managers in systems 
engineering and systems engineers in project managers.  This training should 
include risk management.  Risk management could be the common language 
between systems engineering and project management.  This understanding and 
common language could result in better allocation of resources, improved budget 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
In developing a product, ideally project management and systems 
engineering converge to satisfy both the business process and the product 
process.  Project management focuses on the tasks required to support the 
development of the product with emphasis on schedule, budget, and 
performance. Systems engineering focuses on the technical aspects related to 
meeting the customer’s needs through the design and development of a solution 
or product. 
Project management is concerned with managing budgets and schedules 
while systems engineering is concerned with developing products and systems. 
Because of these differing concerns, conflicts can arise between the project 
management and the systems engineering objectives.   
Budget and schedule drive projects, while milestones drive the systems 
engineering process and the product development process.  Thus, conflicts can 
arise between the project management and the systems engineering objectives.   
This work discusses some of these conflicts through case studies, 
specifically, the Hubble telescope, the Mars Polar Lander, the Demonstration of 
Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) Program, and the Constellation 
program, and identifies where in the product process they happen, and discusses 
ways in which these can be resolved or prevented. 
B. PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT  
Ulrich and Eppinger (2012, p. 2) define product development as “a set of 
activities beginning with the perception of market opportunity and ending in the 
production, sale, and delivery of the product.” Throughout this work, the product 
development processes is represented by the Ulrich’s and Eppinger’s generic 
model shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1.  Generic product development process model (After Ulrich & Eppinger, 
2012) 
Ulrich and Eppinger’s model outlines the following steps: 
 Planning:  This phase involves the development of the approach 
proposed to achieve the desired product. The planning phase 
identifies things like the customer, product functionalities and top-
level requirements, and schedule and cost restrictions. 
 Concept development:  During this phase, the team identifies the 
customer’s needs, develops concepts, and establishes 
requirements that are more detailed.  A concept may be down 
selected or various concepts may be “selected for further 
development and testing” 
 System-level design:  This phase involves the functional 
decomposition of the product into systems architecture.   
 Detail design:  During detail design, the project team will determine 
detail specifications for the product (e.g., “geometry”, “tolerances”) 
as well as the required manufacturing, fabrication, and assembly 
processes.  Documentation is an important part of this phase as it 
will track the history of the product development and manufacturing 
and will trace to future stages. 
 Testing and refinement:  The testing and refinement phase involves 
the evaluation of the product to ensure it meets pertinent 
requirements.  The main objective is to validate and verify that the 
product meets the intended need and that its “performance and 
reliability” are acceptable.  The testing and refinement phase allows 
improvements to the product, usually through the use of prototypes, 
prior to the start-up of the manufacturing phase. 
 
Diamonds represent 
transitions from one stage 
to another. 
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 Production ramp-up:  The production ramp-up phase builds a few of 
the product at a low production rate, establishing the required 
manufacturing system while allowing for any needed improvements 
to the product or the process itself. 
Product development takes place within an organization usually under a 
program or project plan.  Programs and projects are managed using project 
management techniques.  As such, the project schedule usually drives the 
product process.   
The next section describes project management and its relationship with 
product development. 
C. WHAT IS PROJECT MANAGEMENT? 
A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge provides the 
following definition:  
Project: a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique 
product, service, or result.  The temporary nature of projects 
indicates a definite beginning and end.  The end is reached when 
the project’s objectives have been achieved or when the project is 
terminated because its objectives will not or cannot be met, or 
when the need for the project no longer exists. (Project 
Management Institute, Inc., 2013, p. 3) 
Project Management: the application of knowledge, skills, tools, 
and techniques to project activities to meet the project 
requirements. (Project Management Institute, Inc., 2013, p. 6) 
The PMBOK states that project management requires a set of 
management processes to ensure project goals are accomplished.  The book 
groups this processes into five different process groups:   
 The Initiating Process Group gives way to the start of a project.  It 
establishes the view and mission.  
 The Planning Process Group provides the roadmap for the view 
and mission from the Initiating Process Group.   
 Executing Process Group implements the plans established to 
achieve the project goals.  
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 Monitoring and Controlling Process Group ensures the project plan 
carries on as expected and makes adjustments down the line as needed 
to ensure adaptability to changes.   
 Closing Process Group “finalizes activities across all Process 
Groups to formally close the project or phase.” (Project Management 
Institute, Inc., 2013, p. 39) 
Figure 2 depicts how each of these processes start and end within the 
project process.   
 
Figure 2.  Project management process groups interact in a phase or project 
(From Project Management Institute, Inc., 2013) 
Project management’s objective is to deliver the product on time and 
within schedule.  The process groups manage the project effort to ensure 
successful completion of the objective. 
The PMBOK, however, does not address the product processes (i.e., 
processes required to ensure the project’s deliverable meets the customer’s 
needs and performs in a reliable manner and within the established 
specifications).  
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Systems engineering, on the other hand, is about ensuring adequate 
identification of customer’s needs and a product that meets all established 
requirements.  The next section discusses systems engineering. 
D. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
INCOSE’s Systems Engineering Handbook (v3.2) defines systems 
engineering as:  
…an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization 
of successful systems. It focuses on defining customer needs and 
required functionality early in the development cycle, documenting 
requirements, and then proceeding with design synthesis and 
system validation while considering the complete problem: 
operations, cost and schedule, performance, training and support, 
test, manufacturing, and disposal. SE considers both the business 
and the technical needs of all customers with the goal of providing 
a quality product that meets the user needs. (INCOSE, 2010, p. 7)   
Figure 3 shows the DoD 2009 systems engineering process. This figure is 
presented as an example of a commonly used systems engineering process 
model.     
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Figure 3.  DoD systems engineering process model (From Department of 
Defense, 2011) 
Although systems engineering processes may differ somewhat from 
organization to organization, they all have the following basic steps:  stakeholder 
analysis, identification of customer’s need or problem, functional decomposition 
and requirements analysis, detail design and systems architecture, test and 
evaluation (verification and validation), and implementation. 
 Stakeholder’s analysis involves the identification of important 
players in the development of the product.  Stakeholder’s may be 
product’s users, project’s sponsors, developers, designers, 
manufacturers; any entity that may in some way have an input into 
the requirements and standards that will guide the product 
development. 
 Identification of customer’s need or problem will ensure that the 
team is solving the right problem so that the adequate product is 
developed.  This process requires extensive communications with 
the stakeholders and the representation of the problem statement 
in a language that identifies specific goals. 
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 Functional decomposition and requirements analysis break down 
the problem statement into achievable and measurable goals.  
Functional decomposition identifies the functions that the product 
shall perform and assigns performance measures and 
specifications.  In addition to performance requirements, attributes 
such as weight, size, appearance, and human factors are also part 
of the product requirements. 
 Detail design and systems architecture translates the functional 
decomposition into system architecture.  The Systems engineering 
team will assign requirements and specifications to the subsystems 
and components of the system.  During this stage, the Systems 
engineering will pay special attention to the decomposition of 
requirements from top-level systems requirements to sub-systems 
requirements to component level requirements and specifications.  
Another paramount task during this stage is tracking system’s 
interface requirements.  Components that may work adequately by 
themselves may malfunction or inadequately interface when 
integrated as a subsystem or a system.  
 Test and evaluation (verification and validation) helps ensure that 
the team built the right product and that they built it right.  The 
results from this work can only be as good as the requirements and 
specifications from which it derives its evaluation methods.  This 
work highlights the importance of adequate definition of 
requirements and suitable functional decomposition.  Inadequate 
requirements definition will lead to a product that may not meet the 
customer’s needs or a defectively built product. 
 Implementation brings the product to the customer.  Data is usually 
still collected to investigate the capability of the product to meet the 
customer’s need.  The systems engineering team will collect data 
from the customer; useful for any further developments of the 
product. 
As shown by the steps above, in a product development environment 
systems engineering deals with the product process.  Early incorporation of 
systems engineering process into the project helps with problem definition and 
product functionality and eventually diminishes the probability of design changes 
later in the process.  The later in the process changes in design are made, the 
costlier it is for the project (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4.  Cumulative percentage life cycle cost against time  
(From INCOSE, 2011) 
Given that project management drives the project process and systems 
engineering deals with the product process, it is only logical that these two 
disciplines should work closely to guarantee the success of the project and 
successful development of the right product.  Success with project and product 
does not always happen, as will be exemplified by the discussion in this work. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In organizations where project management guides the project process 
and systems engineering guides the product process, it is imperative that these 
two processes work in congruence.  Failure to do this may result in cost and 
schedule overruns and in poor product performance.   
This work discusses common issues that occur from the inadequate 
integration of systems engineering into the project management process.  As 
such, this work researches the following questions: 
 What are the most common conflicts between Program 
Management and Systems Engineering during product 
development? 
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 Where in the product development cycle do conflicts occur? 
 How can the conflicts be mitigated? 
F. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
It is hoped that the results from this study will provide useful guidance and 
information on how to improve product development. 
G. SCOPE AND APPROACH 
1. Scope 
This work discusses issues with inadequate systems engineering 
integration with the project management process using various representative 
NASA programs.   
2. Approach 
This work starts by presenting fundamental concepts of product 
development, project management, and systems engineering.  It continues on to 
discuss various National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
programs that encountered issues or mishaps due to either inadequate 
integration of systems engineering with the project management process or for 
missing systems engineering steps within the project process.  Each case is 
analyzed separately.  Where applicable, supporting literature review on product 
development, project management, or systems engineering is discussed. 
H. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This work is organized in seven different chapters.  Chapters II through V 
discuss the Hubble telescope, the Mars Polar Lander, the Demonstration of 
Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) Program, and the Constellation 
program case studies respectively.  Chapter VI contains a discussion of the case 
studies and similar findings in literature review.  Chapter VII includes the final 
conclusions and recommendations.  
 
10 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
11 
II. CASE STUDY 1: HUBBLE TELESCOPE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses NASA’s Hubble telescope program.  A background 
on the program in presented, followed by an account of the systems failure. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Scientists and engineers developed the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 
(see Figure 5), with the ultimate objective of deepening our understanding of the 
universe. A space telescope would provide images like no other telescope 
before.  The images would be free of the limitations imposed by the Earth’s 
atmosphere. 
 
Figure 5.  Optical telescope assembly. “The Optical Telescope Assembly has a 
2.4-m Ritchey-Chretien telescope with a focal ration of f/24.  The 
optical range of the Hubble Space Telescope extends from 1,100 to 
11,000 angstroms, and the performance quality in the ultraviolet is 
unique.” (From National Aeronautics and Space Administration,  
1990, pp. 2-1–2-2) 
The work for the HST was divided among different organizations.  Figure 6 
shows the breakdown of responsibilities associated with the development and 
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fabrication of the HST.  As can been seen from the figure, Perkin-Elmer 
Corporation (P-E) was responsible for the design, build, and assembly of the 
optical telescope assembly (OTA).  Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Inc. 
(LMSC) was responsible for the development of the support systems module, full 




Figure 6.  Breakdown of responsibilities for HST development (From (National Aeronautics  
and Space Administration, 1990) 
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C. THE MISHAP 
The “Hubble Space Telescope Optical Systems Failure Report” describes 
the HST mishap as follows: 
The rough grinding operation for the Hubble Space Telescope 
began in December 1978, at the Perkin-Elmer Corporation, in 
Wilton, Connecticut. The mirror was then transferred to Perkin-
Elmer in Danbury, Connecticut, now Hughes Danbury Optical 
Systems, Inc. (HDOS), where polishing was completed in April 
1981, and the mirror was accepted as ready for reflective coating. 
The final post-coating test was made in February 1982. 
Approximately two months after launch, on June 21, 1990, the 
Hubble Space Telescope Project Manager announced that there 
was a major flaw in one or both of the mirrors in the Optical 
Telescope Assembly. (National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, 1990) 
In summary, a thorough investigation led by the Hubble Space Telescope 
Optical Systems Board of Investigation discovered that the telescope had myopic 
vision because it had been ground into the wrong shape.  A 1 mm error in the 
reflective null corrector (RNC) went undetected by Perkin-Elmer (P-E) developers 
and their acceptance testing (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
1990).  The RNC was a newly developed set up for the HST by Perkin-Elmer.  P-
E considered existing techniques, refractive null correctors (RvNC), not accurate 




Figure 7.  Two element refractive null corrector. (From National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, 1990) 
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Figure 8.  Reflective null corrector developed for the HST program  
(From (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1990) 
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D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HUBBLE SPACE 
TELESCOPE OPTICAL SYSTEMS BOARD OF INVESTIGATION 
The Hubble Space Telescope Optical Systems Failure Report (National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1990) states that initial testing with the 
refractive null corrector showed evidence of spherical aberration on the primary 
mirror.  P-E discarded the results, thinking there was something wrong with the 
refractive null corrector.  No independent review or test was conducted.  Tests 
conducted by P-E prior to launch and using the reflective null corrector indicated 
the mirror exceeded the required specifications.  This post launch testing by P-E 
revealed evidence of the problems with the telescope mirror prior to launch, i.e., 
a manufacturing defect.  The question was “why was it not identified prior to 
launch” (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1990, p.iii)?  The 
Hubble Space Telescope Optical Systems Board of Investigation found that 
several issues within HST product development process led to the situation. 
1. Root Causes: Quality Control and Documentation 
Figure 9 show the phases within the product development process where 
the HST program exhibited problems. 
 
Figure 9.  Phases within the HST product development process where issues 
were identified. (Phases highlighted in red showed issues) (After 
Ulrich & Eppinger, 2012) 
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The Board of Investigation determined that a quality assurance (QA) plan 
was developed for the OTA.  However, the details in the plan were not clear.  
Specifically, there was a lack of traceability of QA requirements to specific 
components and to testing requirements.  The QA plan did not provide enough 
direction and requirements so as to offer an effective evaluation of the polishing 
and testing processes. 
In addition, the QA activity was not adequately staffed and, in apparent 
conflict of interests, the QA personnel reported to the OTA project manager.  The 
result was an ineffective and limited QA team that was the subject of pressure of 
project budget and schedule. 
The QA plan is usually establish during the planning stages of the product 
development process.  However, this plan should be revised when transitioning 
from one product development process stage to the other.  Specifically, entrance 
criteria to design reviews should include updates and status on QA processes. 
2. Root Causes: Risk Management and Team Communications  
The Board of Investigation concluded that the HST program did not have 
an adequate Risk Management process.  The team failed to identify the mirror 
manufacturing as a high-risk undertaking and therefore did not properly 
implemented mitigation steps to counter any issues. 
Risk management starts in the planning phases just as the QA plan.  Risk 
management evolves with the developing project and requires constant 
discussion and assessment from the team.  A good systems engineering 
analysis would have identified as a high risk that the fabrication and testing of the 
primary mirror did not have adequately defined QA requirements. 
Another high-risk item identified by the HST Board of Investigation was the 
lack of interaction between the component developers. According to the HST 
Board “contributing to poor communications was an apparent philosophy at 
Marshal Space and Flight Center at the time to resolve issues at the lowest 
19 
possible level and to consider problems that surfaced at reviews to be indications 
of bad management”  (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1990, 
p.10-2).  Having a systems engineering team that can identify high-risk items  
 
throughout the project and help serve as a communication link between the 
different sub-subsystems teams can greatly increase the likelihood of project 
success. 
3. Root Causes: Schedule and Cost Pressures 
The Board of Investigation states that the HST management were under 
schedule and budget pressures.   
At one point during the fabrication cycle of the primary mirror, an 
urgent recommendation for independent tests to check for gross 
error entered the system, but was apparently not acted upon….. at 
the completion of mirror polishing, the final review of data for a final 
report was abandoned and the team reassigned as a cost-cutting 
measure. (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1990, p. 
10-4) 
Dealing with cost and schedule pressures is not easy.  A risk mitigation 
plan and strict control gates (design reviews) would have helped ease the 
pressures on the HST program.  Forsberg and Mooz (2002) state that control 
gates (design reviews) should pay attention to the project evolving business case 
and identify, if needed, ways in which the project must be adapted to meet the 
new business realities.  
Good communication amongst team members and organizations involved, 
as well as excellent risk management processes will make it possible for a 
project to react effectively to changing needs. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Waldrop (1990, p. 735) stated that the HST blunder might have happened 
“due to a combination of managerial laxness and technological hubris.” In reality, 
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what the HST case shows are the dangers of failing to carry on an effective Risk 
Management plan and sound systems engineering practices.  
Effective systems engineering should have ensured adequate 
communication among the subsystems and components developers and would 
have identified high-risk items within the program. 
Most importantly, paying attention to the evolving business case and 
scrutinizing changes within the business case during control gates would have 






III. CASE STUDY 2: MARS POLAR LANDER 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses NASA’s Mars Polar Lander program.  A 
background on the program in presented followed by an account of the systems 
failure. 
B. BACKGROUND 
According to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory Special Review Board (2000), 
“The Mars Polar Lander (MPL), with two Deep Space 2 (DS2) probes, was 
launched on 3 January 1999 for arrival at Mars on 3 December 1999” (Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory Special Review Board, 2000, p. 4). 
The objective of the MPL (Figure 10) and DS2 (Figure 11) mission was “to 
address the science theme: 
…volatiles and climate  history on Mars, thereby directly addressing 
the climate-history and resource themes of the Mars Surveyor 
Program, while supporting the life-on-Mars theme through 
characterization of climate change and its evolving impact on the 
distribution of water. (NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 1998)  
  
Figure 10.  Mars Polar Lander (From NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, n.d.) 
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Figure 11.  DS2 (From National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1999) 
1. CONOPS 
The MPL DS2 mission was ambitious.  In addition to the analysis and 
study of water on Mars, the mission would test several new technologies.  The 
technologies would enable soil sampling, meteorology analysis, seismic 
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monitoring, the detection of carbon dioxide and ice water within the soil, and 
photographing the area around the lander.  Figures 12 and 13 show some of the 
technologies that the MPL and the DS2 were carrying. 
 







Figure 13.  Instrumentation on board DS2 (From National Aeronautics and  
Space Administration, 1999) 
The MPL left the Earth on January 3, 1999.  It was expected to reach 
Mars on December 3, 1999.  The MPL was to use retro rockets during its landing 
stage onto Mars.  The retro rockets purpose was to decelerate the lander.  The 
entry, descent, and landing CONOPS presented on Figure 14 is described in the 
Mars Polar Lander/ Deep Space 3 Press Kit (National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, 1999) as follows: 
 Before entering the Mars atmosphere, cruise stage would be 
jettisoned.  It is at this point that the DS2 would separate from the 
lander. 
 The spacecraft would be traveling at 15, 400 miles per hour (mph) 
when entering the Mars atmosphere. 
25 
 The parachute deployment was scheduled to happen around the 
point where the lander was traveling at 960 mph. At this point, the 
lander would jettison the heat shield. 
 The deployment of the lander legs would happen at around “70 to 
100 seconds before landing” followed by the landing radar start-up.  
(National Aeronautics & Space Administration, 1999, p. 20) 
 Following “radar ground acquisition” the lander would separate from 
the backshell and the descent engines would start-up.  These 
descent engines would have kept the lander in the right bearings 
for final touchdown.  (National Aeronautics & Space Administration, 
1999, p. 20) 
 “At an altitude of 40 feet or a velocity of 5.4 mph the lander would 
drop straight down at a constant speed.  The descent engines 
would be turned off when touchdown is detected by sensors in the 
footpads.”  This last step, this work concludes, would later prove to 
be at the center of the MPL loss discussion.  (National Aeronautics 
& Space Administration, 1999, p. 22) 
 
Figure 14.  Entry, descend, and landing sequence for the MPL and DS2 (From 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1999) 
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Figure 15 shows the lander flight systems and the different jettison stages. 
 
Figure 15.  MPL flight system (From National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, 1999) 
C. THE MISHAP 
MPL reached Mars as expected on December 3, 1999.  Around half an 
hour after touchdown, the MPL team should have started receiving 
communications.  It never happened.  MPL never communicated.  Late January 
2000 dates the last attempts from the team to communicate with MPL.  Attempts 
to gather visual information using the Mars Orbiter Camera also proved 
unsuccessful. 
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The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Review Board was established on 
December 16, 1999 to determine the root cause behind the failure of the mission.  
The JPL Review Board identified several possible technical reasons as the cause 
behind the failure.  The most likely cause identified was the premature shut down 
of the descent engines due to a bogus or faulty sensor indication of ground 
contact.  Other probable causes: heat-shield failure, loss of control due to 
dynamics effects, loss of control due to center of mass offset, landing site not 
survivable, lander impacted by the backshell or parachute covered the lander  
(Jet Propulsion Laboratory Special Review Board, 2000). 
Figure 16 shows the different possible, impossible, and possible-but-




Figure 16.  MPL entry, descent, and landing potential failures (From Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory Special Review Board, 2000) 
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D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The JPL Review Board established the possible technical causes for the 
MPL failure, but the JPL Board also identified project management and systems 
engineering issues that led to inadequate technical decisions.  They discussed 
the issues as part of their recommendations.  
1. Root Causes: Schedule and Budget Pressure 
The report from the JPL Review Board stated that the MPL project was 
under tight budget and schedule constraints from the beginning.  In order to 
compensate, JPL staffed the project with minimal government support and relied 
mostly “on Lockheed Martin Astronautics management and engineering 
structure” (Jet Propulsion Laboratory Special Review Board, 2000, p. 6).  In 
addition, single individuals were tasked with supervising crucial technical areas of 
the project.  JPL employees worked excessive hours (60–80 hours) and they had 
little time left for project interactions and discussions. For future projects, the JPL 
Board (2000) stated that systems engineering should be started during the initial 
phases of the project.   
Systems engineering identifies stakeholders and customers’ needs early 
in the process.  This identification helps the prioritization of resources allocation 
and project goals.  Figure 17 shows the different product development stages 
where the project failed systems engineering-project management integration.  
The planning and concept development stages are identified, as these are early 
stages in the process where the stakeholder’s analysis and project goals are 
identified and refined.  
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Figure 17.  Product development stages where the MPL project showed 
difficulties (After Ulrich & Eppinger, 2012) 
2. Root Causes: Systems Engineering 
The JPL Board concluded that “systems engineering resources were 
insufficient to meet the needs of the project” (2000, p. 9).  As a result, some 
system level analysis and requirements were inadequate or incomplete.  
Furthermore, DS2 design did not allow for critical mission phases tests to be 
performed once it was fully assembled. 
The final recommendation from the board stated that a project shall 
maintain adequate systems engineering support throughout the product 
development process.   
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The two JPL Review Board recommendations presented above certainly 
go hand in hand.  In Understanding the Value of Systems Engineering, Honour 
(2004) determined, “increasing the level and quality of systems engineering has 
positive effect on cost compliance, schedule compliance, and subjective quality 
of the projects.”  Therefore, inadequate systems engineering will eventually affect 
schedule and cost. 
One of the reasons behind the effect on cost and schedule is that systems 
engineering guides the clear identification of customer’s needs and product 
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requirements. Establishing clear product requirements translates into the test and 
evaluation parameters needed for systems integration.  A clear plan from the 
beginning could translate in clearer, better, and faster execution of the integration 
phase. 
It is important, therefore, for the systems engineer and the project 
manager to establish at the beginning of a project a systems engineering plan 
and a systems engineering management plan to state the level of effort of the 
systems engineering team.  This plan should clearly identify roles and 
responsibilities and entrance and exit criteria for the predetermined gates (design 
reviews).  Furthermore, establishing this clear entrance and exit criteria in the 
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IV. CASE STUDY 3: DEMONSTRATION OF AUTONOMOUS 
RENDEZVOUS TECHNOLOGY (DART) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses NASA’s DART program.  A background on the 
program and the system’s failure is presented.  The discussion also includes the 
results of the analysis performed by NASA’s Mishap Investigation Board.  The 
later part of the chapter contains an analysis of the findings from a project 
management-systems engineering interactions perspective.  The chapter 
concludes with a relationship analysis of the issues identified and the Product 
Development Process. 
B. BACKGROUND 
DART (Figure 18) was a flight demonstrator intended to conduct 
autonomous rendezvous maneuvers.  DART was envisioned as a leap forward 
for the United States (U.S.) Space Program: 
Future applications of technologies developed by the DART project 
will benefit the nation in future space systems development 
requiring in-space assembly, services, or other autonomous 
rendezvous operations. (Marshall Space Flight Center, 2004, p. 1) 
Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) proposed DART in response to a 
2001 NASA Research Announcement 8-30 (NRA 8-30) 2nd Generation Reusable 
Launch Vehicle (2nd GRLV).  NASA awarded the DART contract to OSP “as a 
high-risk technology demonstration project”. In November 2002, 2nd GRLV 
became two new programs: the Orbital Space Plane (OSP) Program and the 
Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT) Program. DART became part of 
OSP. It was at this point that DART gained greater emphasis “because 
automated rendezvous technology was considered to be critical in supporting the 
potential future needs of the International Space Station Program” (Marshall 
Space Flight Center, 2005). 
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1. Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
DART was developed by Orbital Sciences Corporation of Dulles, Virginia.  
It was designed to be launched on a Pegasus vehicle using a Stargazer L-1011 
aircraft.  According to the Marshall Space Flight Center, “Once on orbit, DART 
would travel around the Earth to rendezvous with the target satellite, the Multiple 
Paths, Beyond-Line-of-the-Site Communications (MUBLCOM) satellite” (2004,  
p. 2).  
 
Figure 18.  DART at Vanderberg Air Force Base (From Wikipedia DART 
(satellite), n.d.) 
During its mission, DART would demonstrate its advanced video guidance 
sensor (AVGS).  The demonstration of AVGS was key for the whole mission, as 
it had advanced optics and electronics that would allow DART to communicate 
with MUBLCOM (Figure 19) and conduct proximity maneuvers “within a range of 
5 to 250-plus meters” (Marshall Space Flight Center, 2004, p. 2). 
Once DART reached a station keeping position, it would start different 
rendezvous maneuvers moving closer to and away from the target satellite.  It 
would eventually move away from the target satellite and go into “departure burn 
(to move it away from MUBLCOM), expel its remaining fuel, and place itself into 
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a short-lifetime retirement orbit in compliance with NASA safety standards” 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2006, p. 3). 
 
Figure 19.  Artist depiction of DART and MUBLCON satellite  
(From Wikipedia DART (satellite), n.d.) 
C. THE MISHAP 
The “Overview of the DART Mishap Investigation Results” (National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2006), indicated that DART was launched 
effectively from the Pegasus rocket on April 15, 2005.  
DART carried out the first phases of the mission successfully.  During the 
later stages (proximity maneuvers) DART started using more fuel than had been 
anticipated in flight estimates.  Eleven hours into the mission, DART determined 
it had reached low fuel levels and began moving away from the target satellite 
and initiated a rocket engine burn.  In addition to cutting the mission short from its 
planned original 24 hours, DART bumped into the MUBLCON.  The MUBLCON 
was “pushed into a higher orbit” (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
2006, p. 4). 
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D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE MISHAP 
INVESTIGATION BOARD (MIB) 
The MIB found four reasons for the DART’s premature retirement.  All 
related to software issues: 
 Inadequate error between the calculated and measured positions 
 Flawed velocity calculations 
 A “navigational system overly-sensitive to erroneous data” 
 “Incorrect gain control in the calculations” 
The MIB further identified the root causes that led to these software 
problems.  The following sections present some of these root causes as well as 
an analysis of their relationship to the Product Development phases and the 
systems engineering—project management relationship. 
1. Root Causes: System Requirements 
Figure 20 shows where in the product development process the different 
root causes took place in the DART Program. 
 
Figure 20.  Phases within the DART product development process where issues 
were identified. (Phases highlighted in red showed issues) (From 
Ulrich & Eppinger, 2012) 
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DART was procured under the NRA announcement (as a high-risk low-
budget technology demonstration).  According to the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration Engineering and Safety Center (2006), “NASA procured 
only the data and set broad requirements.”  It was up to OSC to determine how 
to meet those broad requirements through the detail design.  OSC based many 
of the design aspects on the Pegasus vehicle design.  As a consequence, some 
of the software features, though adequate for Pegasus, where inadequate for 
“autonomous in-space operations” (Marshall Space Flight Center, 2005).   
The MIB recommended that the NRA process be used for “initial 
conceptual designs.”  Mission spacecraft design should be procured under other 
type contracts with higher levels of scrutiny and government control on systems 
specification and design features (National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, 2006). 
2. Root Causes: Inadequate Systems Engineering and Schedule 
Pressure 
Figure 21 shows the stakeholders in the DART program.  In an 
environment where there exist a large number of stakeholders, inadequate 
management and coordination of the organizations involved in the system design 
could lead to inadequate system performance.  The MIB discovered that a series 
of design issues were not reviewed or tested adequately due to poor systems 
engineering and systems integration processes.  The MIB recommended that 
NASA require rigorous training for systems engineers in addition to training 
project and program managers in systems engineering.  
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Figure 21.  DART’s main components and manufacturers (From National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2010) 
3. Root causes: Schedule Pressure and Lack of Adequate Gates 
for Design Maturity 
There was a “late change to the navigations logic’s gain setting.”  Due to 
schedule constraints, the program continued moving forward without the 
evaluation of this change through testing.  Consequently, the DART team never 
discovered a problem with a “lower gain setting” that eventually contributed to the 
mishap (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2006).   
The MIB recommendation stated the implementation of “checks and 
balances” throughout the entire development process, from concept design to 
operational stage, to ensure adequate maturity of the design and technically 
sound peer review of the efforts (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
2006). 
The same holds true for contractor work review.  MIB recommended 
frequent technical reviews of the efforts and the use of clear entrance and exit 
criteria prior to each milestone review. 
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4. Root Causes: Risk Management and the Business Case 
DART was originally a “low-cost high-risk demonstration.”  The business 
case evolved and DART became a poster child for NASA’s autonomous vehicles 
programs.  However, DART was still managed under the NRA process and the 
level of government oversight was not increased and NASA’s systems 
engineering processes and software design requirements were not enforced.     
The MIB report stated, “A rigorous assessment and decision process for 
managing risk includes ongoing evaluation of NASA’s priorities” (National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2006).  This work concludes that the 
DART program failed to evaluate NASA’s priorities and failed to adjust execution 
to implement more rigorous systems integration practices.  As a result, risk 
management was inadequate for the program and led to things like inadequate 
testing of important systems features like the collision avoidance sub-system. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The DART program suffered from a series of issues related to systems 
engineering integration into the project management process.   
There was inadequate use of systems engineering at the beginning of the 
process.  This inadequate use of systems engineering resulted from what the 
MIB identified as a lack of experience by the systems engineering team and a 
lack of understanding by the project management of systems engineering 
processes. 
This work concludes that the project would have benefited from a more 
rigorous systems engineering process.  The use of technical gates or reviews 
and the enforcement of systems and software design specifications and 
standards would have helped guide the integration and identify technical risks.  
Identification of technical risks would have helped the project manager make 
more informed budget and schedule decisions to meet the changing business 
case. 
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V. CASE STUDY 4: THE CONSTELLATION PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses NASA’s Constellation program.  A background on 
the program is presented, followed by an account of the reasons behind the 
program demise. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In accordance with the Constellation Program: Lessons Learned report 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2011): 
NASA formed the Constellation Program in 2005 to achieve the 
objectives of maintaining American presence in low-Earth orbit, 
returning to the moon for purposes of establishing an outpost, and 
laying the foundation to explore Mars and beyond in the first half of 
the 21st century.   
The Constellation program would also develop a vehicle (named Orion) to 
replace the space shuttle. 
This program was premised on developing an evolutionary capability 
approach.  The initial capability (IC) would focus on the vehicles and ground 
infrastructure needed to service the International Space Station (ISS) by 2015.  
This first stage involved the use of a crew launch vehicle, Ares 1, and a crew 
exploration vehicle, Orion.  The second stage, known as the Constellation lunar 
capability (LC) would add the capability needed to carry lunar missions.  The LC 
required a cargo launch vehicle (Ares V), a lunar lander (Altair), and required 
spacesuits.  The LC also separated the crew from the cargo in order to improve 
the probability of crew loss from 1/100 for the Space Shuttle to 1/1000 for the 
new program (Thomas, Hanley, Rhatigan, & Neubek, 2013).  Figure 22 shows an 
artist’s rendition of the Orion and the Ares V.  Figure 23 shows a depiction of 
Ares I and Ares V. 
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Figure 22.   Ares I and the Orion crew exploration vehicle (From United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2009) 
 
Figure 23.  Ares V and Ares I vehicles (From United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2009) 
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Johnson Space Center (JSC) managed the Constellation program.  The 
hardware development work spread out through several organizations, as shown 
in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24.  Constellation program allocation of responsibilities (From National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2011) 
C. THE END OF THE CONSTELLATION PROGRAM 
In 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated that NASA 
was: 
…still struggling to develop a solid business case—including firm 
requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition 
strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time—
needed to justify moving the Constellation program forward into the 
implementation phase. (United States Government Accountability 
Office, 2009, p. 2) 
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GAO identified an inadequate funding environment.  In addition, they 
identified design and technical risks that might have translated into an inability to 
meet performance and safety requirements.  Because of these issues, NASA 
had delayed schedule, forward shifting the dates of important milestones.  In 
addition, the lack of adequate funding prevented the NASA team from fully 
resolving design issues and forced them to shift resources to critical areas that 
were higher in risk.  This shifting of resources resulted in delays in the 
development of the LC due to allocation of resources to the IC stage and ISS 
support. 
At the time of the GAO report, NASA had allocated $10 million dollars in 
contracts although there was uncertainty as to the cost of Orion and Ares. 
Although some features of the Constellation program were kept, the program 
was cancelled in February 2010 (Thomas, Hanley, Rhatigan, & Neubek, 2013). 
D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Thomas et al. (2013) identified some key aspects of the Constellation 
program: 
 Scope creep 
 Late addition of the system integration function 
 Funding uncertainty  
 Difficult integration of NADA multi-centers interactions within the 
program 
The next section addresses the first three points. 
1. Root Causes: The Late Addition of the System Integration 
Function and Scope Creep  
The Constellation program was a huge, complicated endeavor consisting 
of several important goals:  replacing the Space Shuttle, providing support to the 
ISS, establishing an outpost on the moon, and eventually transporting humans to 
Mars.  The Orion and Ares tasks, though, preceded the establishment of the 
Constellation program.   
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The Orion and the Ares did not have a deep system integration process 
established. Thomas et al. (2013) stated that the systems engineering and 
integration process was very lean with only 5–7.5 percent of the budget allocated 
to it (versus a historical average of 10–15 percent).  Integration efforts required 
for the Constellation program were underestimated based on the IC.  Some 
aspects of the LC were not available at the time of contract elicitation. 
According to Thomas et al. (2013), even though the program had a 
Systems Engineering Master Plan, most of the programmatic decisions 
(requirements, budgets, design approaches, and acquisition strategies) were 
developed prior to the systems engineering and integration analysis being 
completed.  Thomas et al. (2013, p. 73), also mentioned the scope creep that 
resulted from the inability of the team to separate the IC phase requirements 
from the LC requirements.  LC requirements drove many of the IC requirements 
turning the IC into “more costly and complex than necessary” and increasing the 
“systems engineering complexity.” 
Sound systems engineering processes should have preceded major 
programmatic decisions such as budgets, design approaches, and acquisition 
strategies.  As discussed in the MPL chapter, early implementation of systems 
engineering facilitates the identification of stakeholders, project goals, and 
preliminary system level interfaces.  Clear identification of stakeholders, project 
goals and system level interfaces provides the team with the requisite knowledge 
to identify technical issues, budget uncertainties, and schedule risks when 
allocating required resources. 
Figure 24 identifies the stages of the product development process where 
the Constellation program issues were evident.  The planning phase, the 
conceptual-development phase, and the system-level-design phase presented 
management with major systems engineering conflicts for meeting performance 
requirements within budget and schedule.  Due to the cancellation of the 
program after the preliminary design review (PDR), Figure 25 does not identify 
the transitions or gates.  
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Figure 25.  Product development phases where the Constellation program 
showed conflicts between systems engineering and project 
management (From Ulrich & Eppinger, 2012) 
2. Root causes: Funding Uncertainty 
Funding within the Constellation program was uncertain.  Thomas et al. 
(2013) stated that there was a 10 percent cut in budget prior to entering an early 
major milestone, Preliminary Design Review (PDR).  Decisions made during the 
planning stages, such as commonality between the IC and the LC, which would 
not be achievable under the new budget realities.  In order to meet new budget 
constraints, management had to select one of two options: delay schedule or 
down scope the mission.  The decision was to delay the schedule. 
Yearly continuing resolutions (CRs) also plagued the Constellation 
program.  This uncertainty in funding had a strong, negative influence on the 
program, as it was difficult to maintain developmental efforts when project 
personnel were unsure of tasks, paychecks, and government commitment to the 
program.  Figure 26 shows a comparison between a typical development curve 
and the exiting Constellation program’s budget to achieve initial operating 
capability (IOC). Figure 27 shows the budget cuts to the program through the 
years.  From 2006 through 2010, Constellation received at least five billions 
dollars less than what was initially estimated the program would need. 
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Figure 26.   Typical development curve versus Constellation budget profile for 
IOC  (Cx IOC= Constellation initial operating capability) (From 




Figure 27.  Graph of funding costs for the Constellation program. The Exploration System Architecture Study (ESAS) 
estimated the initial program budget baseline is represented in red.  The blue line depicts the program 
manager’s recommendation (PMR).  The gray dashed line represents the president’s budget submittal (PBS). 
(From Thomas, Hanley, Rhatigan, & Neubek, 2013) 
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According to Thomas et al. (2013), the initial budget estimates for the 
Constellation program provided enough budget reserve.  The purpose of the 
reserve was to fund risk mitigation efforts.  However, due to budget uncertainty 
and large overhead expenditure, NASA eliminated the risk mitigation efforts. 
“Risks were diligently tracked and reported, but many lingered and, indeed, 
accrued due to budget limitations” (National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, 2011, p. 72). Without the funding required for risk mitigation, the 
only possible alternatives left to deal with technical challenges were to down 
scope the program or shift the schedule to future milestone and delivery dates.  
The program deemed performance expectations more important than meeting 
schedule and thus delayed milestones. 
Schedule delays did not improve the situation for Constellation: new 
systems integration issues and risks developed.  The main reason for these 
issues and risks was the inability to provide all required components and 
subsystems at the needed time for integration tests and evaluations.  According 
Thomas et al., “This was the initiating event for a vicious cycle—growing risk 
placing increasing demand on depleted reserves, which are met by slipping 
schedule, which in turn increases risk” (2013).  Figure 28 shows the slip in 
schedule of all major milestones on the program.  For example, during the ESAS 
study, it was proposed that IOC would be achievable by late fiscal year (FY) 
2012.  In 2006, it was estimated that IOC would be achievable by FY 2014.  In 
2007, there was an apparent optimistic view that IOC would be achieved by late 
FY 2013.  By 2009, it was estimated that IOC would not be achieved prior to mid-
FY 2015.  
To add to the budget and schedule crisis, NASA had to decide whether to 
keep and maintain the Space Shuttle infrastructure.  The program’s initial plans 
envisioned that Constellation would utilize the Space Shuttle infrastructure and 
workforce (NASA 2011).  The infrastructure, although not required for IOC, was 
needed for LC.  In order to maintain the capability to support LC, NASA decided 
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to fund the maintenance of facilities and workforce and left the program with 
reduced budget for hardware acquisition.  
The Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition (2006, p. 1) states “risk 
is a measure of future uncertainties in achieving program performance goals and 
objectives within defined cost, schedule and performance constraints.”  The 
systems engineer on a project shall be diligent to identify risks that will affect the 
final product and communicate them to the team and management.  However, 
the Constellation program environment left very little time and resources for the 
systems engineers to effect identified risks, as they had no available funding to 
execute risk mitigation. 
 
Figure 28.  Funding cuts effects on constellation milestones (PDR= preliminary 
design review, CDR= critical design review, HLR= human lunar return) 
(From Thomas et al., 2013) 
Funding allocation, in this case, became a clear determent to proper 
systems engineering application.  The funding decisions in the Constellation 
program demonstrate the eternal struggle within a product development process 
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to balance out schedule, budget, and performance.  The decisions sacrificed 
schedule in an attempt to meet the budget constraints.  With the early 
implementation of a systems engineering and integration analysis, the program 
may have identified design and integration risks earlier.  The program would 
have saved money in re-testing and re-planning that had to occur due to the late 
incorporation of the systems engineering and integration process. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The Constellation program was a major development and integration 
endeavor that was subjected to budget cuts and continuing federal funding 
resolutions.  It is important to note though, that some of the decisions made 
aggravated the situation instead of improving it. 
The execution of systems engineering and integration analysis after 
established programmatic decisions (requirements, budgets, design approaches, 
and acquisition strategies) resulted in inadequate identification of design and 
integration risks.  Although it may have been difficult to predict if Constellation 
could have been saved after all the budget cuts and challenges,  adequate 
systems engineering and integration processes would have helped in the 
analysis of trade-off studies and in the identification of critical technologies that 
would have produced at least the IC. 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarizes the most common conflicts identified in the 
previously discussed case studies.  A literature review presents the perspective 
of other researchers on such issues and compares their experiences with the 
discussed case studies.   
B. COMMON ISSUES 
Table 1 summarizes the issues discussed in the previous chapters.   A 
few common topics among the four projects are: 
 Inadequate systems engineering process or systems engineering 
started late in the process 
 inadequate product requirements 
 inadequate testing and quality parameters 
 inadequate documentation 
 Inadequate risk management 
 Insufficient budget and tight schedule 
According to Langford (2012) conflicts can be thought of as the 
interactions between people (objects) that result in an increase in the use of 
energy, matter, material wealth, or information compared to objects without 
interactions.  A consequence of conflict is the determination of a minimum loss 
due to the interaction.  The reason for conflict is rooted in the difference of 
interests between two parties.  Project managers are prepped to manage 
budgets and schedules (of product development), whereas systems engineers 
are focused on delivering functions, performance, and quality (for products during 
development).  The differences of the interests between project managers and 
systems engineers for developing products, results in conflict when budgets or 
schedules are changed from those planned initially and if problems arise that 
change expectations of stakeholders (such as a product’s performance failing to 
meet requirements).   
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Table 1.   Summary of issues within the programs through the different product 
development phases 
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At the highest level of abstraction, a common set of activities can be 
defined that includes all work carried out by project management and systems 
engineering.  The formalism that outlines this common set of activities builds on 
the unpublished “Software Project Management Metric—Theoretical Basis,  
9 November 2007” by Kadir Demir. The basic structures of work carried out by 
project management and systems engineering are enacted through defined (and 
similar) relations between objects and objects, and objects and processes 
(Langford, 2012).   
The basic structures of work are roots for conflict between project 
management and systems engineering.  The following basic structures are 
redacted from Demir (2007): 
 Create—an object can be created as a result of a process 
 Delete—an object or process can be deleted 
 Transform—an object can be transformed to another object as a 
result of a process 
 Divide—an object or a process can be divided into smaller 
processes or objects 
 Aggregate object—objects can be aggregated into an object  
 Aggregate process—processes can be aggregated into a process 
 Next and Previous Object—objects can be followed or preceded by 
other object(s)  
 Next and previous process—processes can be followed or 
preceded by other process(es) 
 Requires—an object or process may need another object or 
process to exist 
Conflict is recognized in Table 1 as a result of the work planned or 
performed in the indicated product development stages. 
The next sections provide a literature discussion about the project 
management and systems engineering relationship and the issues mentioned 
above. 
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C. INSUFFICIENT SYSTEMS ENGINEERING IN THE PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
Lilburn (1996) analyzed the process followed by the Lockheed Martin 
Idaho Technologies team in trying to put together project management training.  
The objectives of the training were to instruct employees on how to manage 
project work, implement a systems engineering process and culture, and manage 
compliance with project management and systems engineering requirements.  
While developing this training, a problem was encountered when addressing the 
matter of integrating systems engineering into the way of doing business.  
Specifically, integration needed to be built into to the work effort and not just 
something performed on the side. 
A functional decomposition was developed to identify the performance 
related efforts that were essential to “producing products for a customer” (the top-
level function) Thus, their approach was focused on the integration of systems 
engineering and the business process (program management) within a product 
development process. 
Lilburn (1996) questions whether systems engineering is part of planning 
the customer’s product or if it is part of producing the customer’s product.  
Through the functional decompositions developed for the training, Lilburn 
concluded that systems engineering is part of both.  Lilburn further concluded 
that systems engineering is at the heart of the listening process (understanding 
the customer’s need), the creative process (identifying the product that best fits 
the need), and the verification process (does the product produce what the 
customer needs?)  Therefore, Lilburn concluded that integrating systems 
engineering and program management starts with the project team working 
together to meet the customer’s needs.  Primarily, the systems engineer and the 
project manager shall work together to identify and meet the customer’s need. 
Perhaps the single most important conclusion from Lilburn’s work is the fact that 
he identifies that systems engineering is part of the product process from 
beginning to end (listening process, creative process, and verification process).    
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Smith, Cowper, and Emes, (2004, p. 9) proposed that starting systems 
engineering late in the process problem  
…manifests itself as an apparent failure to manage technical 
risk….Excessive, early commitment may be at best nugatory, and 
at worse a blind alley…Late commitment will lead to a lack of 
competitiveness, failure to meet development schedules or 
disappointing performance/reliability in the delivered system. 
Smith et al. (2004) resonates with Honour’s (2004) statement that the 
quality and level systems engineering efforts will affect cost, schedule, and 
quality of the project.  
The works of Smith et al. and Honour (2004) proposed that systems 
engineering efforts do have an effect on project cost and schedule compliance 
and project quality.  Later in 2009 through the comparison of successful to less 
successful programs, Honour (2009, p. 15) stated: 
…poor programs expend comparatively less (systems engineering) 
effort in the front-end activities (mission definition, requirements 
engineering) and greater effort in the later, hands-on activities 
(system design, system integration, and verification/validation). 
Lilburn’s (1996) work proposed that systems engineering is part of the 
listening, creative, and verification process.  Lilburn’s (1996) work also proposes 
that integrating systems engineering and project management starts with a 
working together to meet the customer’s need. In analyzing Smith et al. Honour 
(2004, 2009), and Lilburn’s (1996), this work concludes that, in order to maximize 
the cost and schedule benefits to the project and maximize the what Lilburn’s 
(1996) called the listening, creative, and verification processes, systems 
engineering shall be started in the early stages of the product development 
process.   
The conclusion that systems engineering shall start from the beginning of 
the project contrasts with the manner in which the case studies presented on this 
work evolved.  Specifically, the Constellation program made programmatic 
decisions (requirements, budgets, design approaches, and acquisition strategies) 
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prior to completing the systems engineering and integration analysis.  The 
Constellation approach, according to Lilburn (1996), may have skipped the 
important questions and proceeded to budgeting and design without having the 
full answers to: 
 What is the customer’s need (the objective of the project)? 
 What product would best fit the need? 
 How will the team determine if the product solves the problem or 
meets the projects objectives? 
As a result, the team may have planned a project that could have ended 
up with insufficient resources.  Lack of full understanding of the efforts required to 
integrate, verify, and validate the needed product will eventually lead to an 
underfunded project with a tight schedule.  This assertion explains what 
ultimately led to the cancellation of Constellation.  
In a similar way, the DART program had little government involvement in 
the development of requirements elicitation.  This lack of involvement showed a 
lack of sufficient systems engineering in the identification of the customer’s 
needs.  In the case of the DART program, this eventually translated into design 
and integration issues and inadequate assertion of the design maturity during 
design gates (or reviews).   
A poor product requirements development process hinders the evaluation 
of product performance, thereby making process gates (such as design reviews) 
ineffective in the assertion of technology maturity.  “In the absence of traceable 
requirements management, requirements remain difficult to verify and systems 
performance validation is often problematic” (Smith et al., 2004).  Therefore,  
ineffectiveness of the gate resides in a lack of a well-established product 
performance requirements baseline with which to compare the recommended 
design. 
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D. INSUFFICIENT BUDGET AND TIGHT SCHEDULE  
Bahill and Briggs (2001) studied the issue of systems engineering started 
late in the product development process.  They called the issue the “systems 
engineering started in the middle.” Also, Bahill and Briggs (2001) discussed that 
textbook cases present the systems engineering process usually starting at the 
beginning of the project.  They presented the systems engineering process as 
being involved in the problem identification and the analysis of alternatives.  
Bahill and Briggs pointed out that real-world systems engineering occurs under 
different circumstances.  In day-to-day projects, systems engineering is started 
somewhere in the middle.  This assertion from Bahill and Briggs is exemplifed 
the Constellation program scenario. 
In addition, Bahill and Briggs identified several reasons for systems 
engineering to be started in the middle rather than at the beginning:   
 lack of experience from management; 
 management’s impression that systems engineering costs too 
much; 
 management’s belief that their process was sufficient because it 
had not failed in the past; 
 management’s understanding that they were doing systems 
engineering but nothing was documented. 
Furthermore, Bahill and Briggs (2001) stated that, when a project starts its 
systems engineering in the middle, the cost is two to ten times as much as a 
systems engineering started at the beginning of the system life cycle.  They 
concluded that, when starting systems engineering in the middle, a complete 
systems engineering job cannot be done because it would actually cost too much 
(Bahill & Briggs, 2001).  
Smith et al. (2004) refer to the problem of the “systems engineer in the 
middle” as “ignoring the left shift.”  They defined “left shift” as the earlier 
investment in systems engineering best practices within the development cycle. 
The problem of ignoring the “left shift,” Smith et al. (2004) will become evident 
during the validation and verification stages, due to the lack of traceable 
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requirements.  In consequence, the project may be in danger of an apparent 
failure to manage technical risk, meet development schedule, and disappoint 
customers and users with poor system performance or reliability. 
In the case of the Hubble telescope, there was an inadequate 
development of quality assurance requirements.  The result was a project with an 
insufficiently staffed quality assurance group who were unable to provide 
adequate overview of the quality assurance requirements.  This group was even 
further reduced in size to balance out budget constraints. 
Also, the conclusions found in Bahill and Briggs (2001) and Smith et al. 
(2004) explain why, in part, Constellation may have had serious budget issues.  
In addition to budget cuts and continuous resolutions, Constellation’s inability to 
start a robust systems engineering process from the beginning may had 
eventually led to an ever increasing cost to accomplish systems evaluation and 
integration efforts. 
It is therefore understandable that of the four case studies analyzed, three 
(Hubble, MPL, and Constellation) showed budget pressures and one showed 
schedule pressure (DART).  All the projects showed an inability to implement 
adequate systems engineering.  Incorporating unplanned systems analysis, 
tests, and integration during later stages of the product development will 
eventually lead to cost increases and schedule shifts. 
E. INADEQUATE RISK MANAGEMENT 
Very much in line with Lilburn (1996), Smith and van Gaasbeek (1996) 
stated that while project managers look at the overall project in terms of cost, 
time, performance and constraints, the systems engineer’s focus is most 
probably directed more toward the product of that project.  They concluded that 
the project manager’s focus is directed on the overall project, whereas the 
systems engineer’s focus is directed toward the product of the project.   
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When started in the middle, as described by Bahill and Briggs (2001), 
instead of guiding the product process and then the focus of systems engineering 
will change to the project process.  Instead of identifying the customer, their 
needs and the right product to address these needs, the systems engineer would 
focus on the management team as the customer and would attempt to optimize 
the project process instead of guiding the product process. 
Similarly, Considine (1997) stated that the systems engineer focuses on 
requirements definition for the product and the eventual verification of the product 
design.  The systems engineer’s focus, stated Considine, is to ensure the 
development of an operationally sound system.  In this process, previous 
decisions build the foundation for the history and requirements of the product.  
These decisions “cannot be ignored … since they may well need to be revisited.” 
In contrast, the project manager would focus on delivery of the process.  The 
project manager would concentrate on maintaining progress to get to the next 
project milestone.   
According to Cosidine (1997), the systems engineer’s focus is to ensure 
the development of an operationally sound system.  However, Bahill and Briggs 
(2001) stated that the systems engineer’s focus changes when systems 
engineering is started in the middle.  According to Bahill and Briggs (2001), the 
focus of the systems engineer changes to optimize the project process. Starting 
systems engineering in the middle results in a systems engineering process 
tailored more toward management and not necessarily toward the customer or 
product.  This approach would bring major technical risks to the product that 
would eventually translate into poor product performance, budget, and schedule 
overruns.  The reason for this risk is that the systems engineer may move into 
optimizing the project process and design gates instead of optimizing the 
product.  
Shifting the systems engineering focus from the product to the process 
can greatly affect product requirements definitions.  This could happen because 
the team may be more focused on moving the project along than spending the 
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required time to analyze and correctly define requirements.  Maintaining focus on 
the systems engineering process is essential because, as stated by Meier 
(2008), systems engineering “ties the technical solution to high-level 
requirements and maintains the program baseline”. 
In his work, Meier (2008) highlights the risks of poor traceability to 
requirements high-level requirements.  Among the risks identified are: 
 Developing a technical solution and architecture well before and 
analysis of alternatives has been conducted, 
 Rush into execution phase before facts are in,  
 Sense of urgency leads to decisions being made in the midst of 
inadequate technical, operational, and system understanding. 
The above situations, Meier (2008) stated, will eventually lead to 
unrealistic cost estimates and un-executable schedules.  According to Meier 
(2008), one of the reasons for having unrealistic cost estimates is that operating 
under any of the circumstances mentioned above will result in changes to 
requirements and the “addition or modification of requirements almost always 
leads to cost and schedule growth.” 
The above discussion clarifies why three out of the four case studies had 
risk management issues.  Even the MPL, where the investigation board did not 
identify risk, was identified as having budget and schedule pressure.  This budget 
and schedule pressure led to the conclusion that at some point risk management 
missed something. In analyzing these four case studies, this work therefore 
concludes that the inadequate risk management in these projects was probably 
linked to the faulty definition of the system, its interfaces, and the resources 
needed for development, test and evaluation, and verification and validation. 
Therefore, the discussion leads to the conclusion that, a poorly performed 
systems engineering process, will result in elevated cost, schedule, and 
performance risks.  This conclusion is similar to the Honour’s (2004) conclusion 
that “increasing the level and quality of systems engineering has positive effect 
on cost compliance, schedule compliance, and subjective quality of the projects.”  
63 
F. WHAT IS THE SOLUTION? 
According to Smith et al. (2004), problems experienced by the 
implementation of systems engineering are interface failures within the business 
system.   Without substantial investigation and research, systems engineering 
seems not to be the issue.  The issue stated by Smith et al. was “the interface of 
the systems engineering functions with other elements of a business system 
model.”  
Now this bears on the question of why organizations are failing to 
implement systems engineering when the majority have a defined systems 
engineering process.  In the case studies presented, the issue was never one of 
a lack of a systems engineering process.  The issue was one of and inadequate 
integration of the systems engineering process into the project process.   
Boardman (1994) stated that poor integration of systems engineering with 
business processes and other project processes may be a result from different 
factors.  One factor is the failure to understand each other’s processes.  In his 
work, Boardman proposed that carrying out a project involves two issues:  getting 
on with the project and seeing that the “getting on” is proper; well executed; with 
a sufficiency of process understanding.   
Boardman (1994) regarded systems engineering processes as the “getting 
on” part and the project management as the “seeing to” this “getting on” and 
concluded that it is important that these two be harmonized.  The challenge, he 
concluded, is “to find a system of shared values which will enable and sustain the 
correct attitude among engineers, managers, and the other agents within the 
business.”  In other words, it is of primary importance something will unite the 
team into a common goal.   
Laporte (1998) studied the problem of the integration of software 
engineering, systems engineering, and project management processes.  The 
study found redundancy of efforts among the three processes yet the three were 
treated differently due to inherent differences in the language and procedures of 
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the disciplines.  Risk management was one of the main activities addressed in 
the three processes.  Laporte then proposed the need for common vocabulary 
and processes that do not contradict each other.   
In what could be the solution to the situations exposed by the above 
discussion, Lilburn (1996) stated that, in order to integrate systems engineering 
and program management, personnel must be trained and a change in 
organizational culture was needed.  In a similar manner, Mooz and Forsberg 
(1997) address the culture of systems engineering and project management 
stating that the “discipline separateness is promoted by universities and the 
corresponding professional organizations.”  Mooz and Forsberg conclude that the 
separation among the disciplines results in project managers that manage cost 
and schedule and not the technical content while the technical disciplines 
“ambivalent to the cost and schedule consequences, pursue superior technical 
solutions.” 
This work concludes that an optimal integration of systems engineering 
and project management requires systems engineers trained in project 
management, and project managers trained in systems engineering.  In addition, 
the common language that Boardman and Laporte allude to could be risk 
management.  Working together, the project manager and the systems engineers 
should be able to outline the technical and programmatic risks that will help in the 
budget and schedule management. 
G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed a literature review that reveals what might be 
some of the reasons behind the root causes for the mishaps of the discussed  
 
case studies.  The chapter concludes that the biggest conflicts in the integration 
of systems engineering and project management in the product development 
process are due to: 
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 insufficient systems engineering in the product development 
process 
 insufficient budget and tight schedule 
 inadequate risk management 
The chapter concludes by stating that the optimal integration of systems 
engineering and project management requires systems engineers trained in 
project management, and project managers trained in systems engineering.  In 
addition, the common language that will help manage the budget and schedule is 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS   
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the general observations, conclusions, and 
analysis from this work. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
This work sought the answers to the following questions: 
 What are the most common conflicts between program 
management and systems engineering during product 
development? 
 Where in the product development cycle do they occur? 
 How can they be mitigated? 
1. What are the Most Common Conflicts Between Program 
Management and Systems Engineering During Product 
Development? 
This work identified three conflicts in the product development process:  
insufficient systems engineering in the product development process, insufficient 
budget and tight schedule, and inadequate risk management.  These three 
situations were found to be the root causes for the mishaps and failures of the 
case studies presented.  Though presented as three reasons, they mainly all 
arise from either starting systems engineering late in the process or as 
insufficient application of systems engineering processes in the project as a cost 
reduction effort.  
2. Where in the Product Development Process Do They Occur? 
As presented through the discussion of the different case studies, the 
investigation boards identified issues throughout the product development 




adequate systems engineering process in the early planning stages of the 
product development process will result in issues in the future stages of the 
process. 
Issues presented beyond the planning or concept development stages 
were mainly inabilities to conduct verification and validation efforts due to poorly 
elicited requirements or lack of documentation of the requirements elicitation, 
design, analysis of alternatives, and validation and verification processes. 
3. How Can They Be Mitigated? 
This work proposes that, in order to mitigate conflicts in the integration of 
project management and systems engineering, systems engineers and project 
management shall: 
 be able to have a common language  
 be able to understand each other’s objectives 
 be able to understand how these objectives benefit both the 
product and the project 
This work therefore proposes that in order to achieve that common ground 
and that understanding: 
 Systems engineers shall be trained in project management and 
project managers shall be trained in systems engineering.  The 
cross training should not have the objective of turning systems 
engineers into project management experts or project managers 
into systems engineering experts.  The objective should be geared 
towards achieving a true appreciation of each discipline benefits 
and contributions to the product development process. 
 Training should include risk management.  Risk management could 
be the common language between systems engineering and 
project management.  Adequate risk management will help in better 
allocation of resources, improved budget and schedule 
management, and better control of overall project scope. 
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C. FUTURE WORKS 
Future works stemming from this work should focus on the identification of 
the understanding by project managers on the subject of systems engineering 
and vice versa.  In addition, the topic of the relationship of adequate level of effort 
and quality of systems engineering to effective risk management should be 
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